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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the twenty-five years since the end of the Bosnian
War, there have been continual threats of secession from Bosnia and
Herzegovina (hereafter annotated as BiH) made by the political leaders
of the Republic of Srpska.1 If the secession occurs, two scenarios could
play out. The first is the establishment of a new Serbian majority state
in the geographical boundary of what is now the country of BiH. The
second is the territory of the Republic of Srpska would become
annexed by Serbia proper. Since Serbia has not supported secession
attempts by the Republic of Srpska, the first scenario is much more
likely to occur.2 However, there has been little to no international
support of a Republic of Srpska secession, outside of Russia.3 History
of Serbian aggression during the Bosnian War and the concern of
regional violence following a Republic of Srpska secession are the two
primary causes that the movement has not been supported by the
European Union or the United States.4
The first call for secession was in 1996, a year after the Bosnian
War ended. Biljana Plavšić, the second president of the Republic of
Srpska, called for the country’s secession and unification with what was
left of Yugoslavia — at the time known as the Federal Republic of

* Paul Pepi is a current Ph.D. student in International Studies at Old Dominion
University, Virginia. At the time of the writing and research, he was a student at Penn
State University’s School of International Affairs. His research focus is on the former
Yugoslav republics, European integration, and international security studies. He
obtained dual bachelor’s degrees in History and English from Shippensburg
University in 2019, and a master’s degree in International Affairs in 2021.
1
Denitsa Koseva, Serbia slaps down Republic of Srpska’s secessionist aspirations,
BNE INTELLINEWS (2020), https://www.intellinews.com/serbia-slaps-downRepublic of-srpska-s-secessionist-aspirations-190494.
2 Id.
3 See generally David Salvo &Stephanie De Leon, Russia’s Efforts to Destablize
Bosnia and Herzegovina. GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE U. S. (Apr. 1, 2018),
www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18769.
4
Danijel Kovacevic, Bosnian Serb Leader Repeats Demand for Secession
Referendum,
BALKANINSIGHT
(Feb.
15,
2020),
https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/15/bosnian-serb-leader-repeats-demand-forsecession-referendum/.
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Yugoslavia, which had a large Serbian majority. 5 Among the many
reasons for her calls of secession was the claim that Bosniaks – because
of their religion and ethnicity – were genetically inferior to the Bosnian
Serbs.6 Later she would be charged by the ICTY for two counts of
genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and one count of
murder.7 After Plavšić’s declaration, Serbian secession talks paused
until the recognition of Kosovo in 2008.8 Kosovo’s successful
independence angered many Bosnian Serb civilians and their political
leaders because the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 clearly
defines Kosovo as a province of Serbia, a declaration which the United
Nations, and the Serbian constitution supported.9 10 This resolution
still stands, and has not been overturned to this day. Citizens of the
Republic of Srpska believed that since Kosovo, historically part of
Serbia, could declare independence on demographic grounds, the
Republic of Srpska should be allowed its own referendum on
independence.11 However, the international community held back the
calls for an independence referendum.12 Specifically, the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC), the international body charged with
implementing the Dayton Agreement for BiH, made it clear that none

ROBERT BIDELEUX & IAN JEFFRIES, THE BALKANS: A POST-COMMUNIST
HISTORY 361 (2007).
6
MAYA SHATZMILLER, ISLAM AND BOSNIA: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
FOREIGN POLICY IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 58 (May 5, 2002).
7
Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S, Sentencing
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Feb. 27, 2003),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf.
8
Sylvia Poggioli, Serbs Protest Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, NPR (Feb.
18, 2008), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=19148456.
9 Republic of Srpska Slames Kosovo Recognition ‘Pressure,’ BALKANINSIGHT (Jan.
4,
2013),
https://balkaninsight.com/2013/01/04/dodik-opposes-bosnia-srecognition-of-kosovo/.
10
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1244. UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL (June 10, 1999), https://peacemaker.un.org/kosovoresolution1244.
11 Priznanje
Kosova i referendum u RS, B92 (Feb. 22, 2008)
https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2008&mm=02&dd=22&nav_id
=285932.
12 Bosnia Serb PM Dismisses US Aid Cuts, BALKANINSIGHT (Mar. 5, 2008)
https://balkaninsight.com/2008/03/05/bosnia-serb-pm-dismisses-us-aid-cuts/.
5
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of the entities hold any right to self-determination under the Dayton
peace accords.13
A 2010 poll from Gallup Balkan Monitor showed that nearly
90% of Serbian citizens supported an independence referendum.14 The
same poll showed that a majority of the Serbians believed that the
Kosovo independence would ultimately aid the Serbian secession
movement.15 The next year, officials of the Republic of Srpska
proposed a referendum on leaving the institutions of BiH. However,
the European Union (E.U.) prevented it from being carried out,
because they believed it could destabilize the region by inciting war in
BiH.16 In 2012, the president of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad
Dodik, predicted that the Republic of Srpska would eventually be an
independent country capable of functioning as an independent state.17
Surprisingly, this statement was supported by many Western officials,
including Steven Meyer, the former CIA Balkans chief, who believes
that a new Serbian state is inevitable.18 In 2015, the largest Serb party
in BiH the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), used
an independence referendum as a threat to receive more autonomy and
to reform the Constitutional Court, but the E.U. and the United States
stopped the referendum when the Republic of Srpska’s demands were
not met.19 Finally, in February 2020, Dodik, still president of the

Id.
Danas, Za nezavisnu RS 88 odsto građana, DANAS (Nov. 19, 2010),
https://www.danas.rs/drustvo/za-nezavisnu-rs-88-odsto-gradjana/.
15 Id.
16 Bosnia: What Does Republic of Srpska Want?, INT’L CRISIS GROUP (Oct 6,
2011),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-andherzegovina/bosnia-what-does-Republic of-srpska-want.
17
Bojana Barlovac, Dodik: Republic of Srpska Will Be Independent,
BALKANINSIGHT (Oct. 5, 2012), https://balkaninsight.com/2012/10/05/dodikRepublic of-srpska-will-be-independent/.
18
Steven Meyer, The Dayton Accords: Anchor to the Past or Bridge to the Future?,
2
POLITEIA
51,
65–66
(2012),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315651709_The_Dayton_Accords_An
chor_to_the_past_or_bridge_to_the_future.
19
Maja Zuvela, Biggest Serb Party in Bosnia Threatens 2018 Secession, REUTERS
(Apr.
25,2015),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-serbs-secessionidUSKBN0NG0NB20150425. See also, Balkans’ Rising Instability To Exacerbate
European
Security
Concerns,
FITCH
SOLUTIONS
(Feb.
1,
2017),
13
14
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Republic of Srpska, threatened secession over a Constitutional Court
decision regarding ownership of agricultural land in the Republic of
Srpska.20
While the merits and seriousness of the secession attempts are
debated, the historical pattern and frequency of the Republic of
Srpska’s secession attempts hint that such calls will not end in the near
future. Voters in BiH have and will continue to elect nationalists who
contribute to political gridlock which keeps ethnic tensions burning as
they have been for decades.21 Although Serbia does not directly
support the Republic of Srpska’s desire for independence, mainly due
to Serbia’s desire to join the E.U., Republic of Srpska politicians still
see calls for independence as a political weapon to be used to their
advantage.22 Even so, analysts at Fitch Solutions believe that the
weakening of the E.U. post-Brexit make an independent Republic of
Srpska much more likely in the near future.23 Scholars and political
officials educated on the issue tend to agree. Jürgen Buxbaum, a
sociologist who has lived in BiH, plainly claims that the Bosnian Serbs
will undoubtedly vote for independence if given the chance. He
maintains that it is not a question if the referendum will be held, but
instead a question of when.24 Several studies have also pointed to the
fact that, from the citizens’ perspectives, the governmental legitimacy
of the Republic of Srpska is on par with the legitimacy of the
https://www.fitchsolutions.com/country-risk-sovereigns/economics/balkansrising-instability-exacerbate-european-security-concerns-01-02-2017.
20
Danijel Kovacevic, Dodik Unveils Fresh Threat of Bosnian Serb Secession,
BALKANINSIGHT (Feb. 13, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/02/13/dodikunveils-fresh-threat-of-bosnian-serb-secession/.
21
Andrew Higgins, In Bosnia, Entrenched Ethnic Divisions Are a Warning to the
World,
N.
Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/19/world/europe/mostar-bosnia-ethnicdivisions-nationalism.html.
22
Herard Toal, “Republic of Srpska Will Have a Referendum”: the Rhetorical politics
of Milorad Dodik, 41 J. OF NATIONALISM & ETHNICITY 166–204 (2013), available at,
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00905992.2012.747500?scroll=to
p&needAccess=true.
23 Balkans’ Rising Instability to Exacerbate European Security Concerns, supra note
19.
24
Jürgen Buxbaum, An End to the Lies and Self-Deception: Scenarios for the future
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 17 SEER: J. FOR LAB. AND SOC. AFF. IN E. EUR. 167, 167
(2014), available at, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43294043.
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Federation of BiH, even though these entities actively impede each
other politically.25 Russia has already established its support for an
independent Republic of Srpska. If China follows suit, two out of the
five United Nations Security Council members will back this
decision.26
This comment will argue that the secessionist movement of the
Republic of Srpska stems from a long history of ethnic tensions,
among other factors, and that its resolution is highly improbable in the
foreseeable future. Further, this comment will present a clear path for
secession for the Republic of Srpska. Section I provides the relevant
history of BiH and lays the framework for current political and legal
analysis. Subsection A provides historical proof through primary
documents analysis that the Bosnian War was fought because of deepseated ethnic hatred. Subsection B argues that the Dayton Peace
Accords, adopted as the new constitution of BiH maintained and
exacerbated post-war ethnic tensions. Subsection C considers the
other reasons behind ethnic tensions, current economic and political
stagnation, and how the Bosnian War is still being fought at the
political level. The main audience of this comment is intended to be
for those who know little of the Republic of Srpska secessionist
movement, and – perhaps equally as important – why it is happening.
The scarcity of Western academic attention to BiH and the Republic
of Srpska secessionist movement has driven the decision to provide a
lengthy historical background analysis. Next, Section II contemplates
the legality of the Republic of Srpska secessionist movement by
analyzing international legal documents regarding secession, and
international court rulings given to BiH. Subsection A argues that
The first study is by Eiki Berg and Mihkel Solvak who argue that their
research indicates that both entities’ legitimacy is on par with each other, even though
the “two entities remain worlds apart on a range of issues.” See Eiki Berg and Mihkel
Solvak. Muted Differences: Entrenching Legitimacy of the Bosnian Statehood?, 46 COOP. &
CONFLICT, 460, 460 (2011), available at, www.jstor.org/stable/45084674. Another
notable study comes from Eiki Berg the following year, where he reaches the same
conclusion – this time measuring cohesion, security, performance, and democracy to
judge the Republic of Srpska’s and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
legitimacy. See Eiki Berg, Parent States Versus Secessionist Entities: Measuring Political
Legitimacy in Cyprus, Moldova and Bosnia & Hercegovina, 64 EUROPE-ASIA STUD. 1271,
1292 (2012), available at, www.jstor.org/stable/23258287.
26
David Salvo & Stephanie de Leon, supra note 3.
25
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secession is political, not legal in nature, which gives the Republic of
Srpska independence movement strength if the political factors
support it. Subsection B highlights the many human rights failures
given by international courts and other international bodies.
Subsection C reviews the reasons that BiH has failed to implement
constitutional reform in the face of continual international pressure.
Section III provides a pathway to secession that is most likely to
succeed without inflaming ethnic tensions or provoking major players
in the region. Finally, the conclusion provides areas where this research
could be bolstered.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Bosnian War Driven by Inter-Ethnic Hatred
When the collapse of Yugoslavia was obvious following
Slovenia’s and Croatia’s secessions in the early 1990s, Slobodan
Milošević, the leader of what was left of Yugoslavia, acted to guarantee
a strong Serbian state post-Yugoslavia.27 Usually referred to as Greater
Serbia, the idea of the state followed the pathological logic of Serbian
ethnonationalism as it redefines traditional statehood.28 Specifically,
Greater Serbia means that the sovereign state of Serbia exists wherever
there is a Serbian majority, even if it is outside of Serbia proper.29
Milošević himself echoed this idea in a 1991 speech; “Everyone knows
that we in Serbia . . . have committed ourselves to the stand that Serbs
must live in one state.”30 Milošević went on to say that the national
boundaries within the former Yugoslavia have “never been state
borders,” and they were “drawn in the past arbitrarily . . . disregarding
the ethnic composition of the population, the consequences of the
genocide suffered by the Serbian people, or the norms of international

27
Ian Black, Milosevic tried to build Greater Serbia, trial told, THE GUARDIAN
(Oct.
1,
2002),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/02/warcrimes.milosevictrial.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30
Slobodan Milošević, President of the Republic of Serbia, at the Serbian
Assembly, Slobodan Milošević on the Future of Yugoslavia, (May 30, 1991), available at,
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/milosevic053091.htm.
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law.”31 If Serbia existed wherever a Serbian majority happened to live,
then huge swaths of land in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be annexed,
especially if Serbians eradicated or drove out ethnicities from the land
they believed to be rightly theirs.32 This idea was followed by the Army
of the Republic of Srpska, at the behest of Milošević. He would later
die while in international custody facing crimes against humanity at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in
The Hague.33 Following his arrest, he was accused of using rhetoric
that incited instances of ethnic cleansing that took place during the
Yugoslavian Civil War and the Bosnian War.34 Also, he was blamed for
transforming the once ethnically diverse army of Yugoslavia to become
nearly 90% Serbian and using his military apparatus to support Serbian
fighters in Bosnia for a significant portion of the Bosnian War.35
Milošević’s unveiled ethnocentrism personifies the main
reasons the Bosnian War was waged: ethnic hatred and perceived
ethnic superiority.36 This ethnic hatred throughout the Bosnian War
resulted in widespread ethnic cleansing. In July 1995, Serbian fighters
31
The genocide he is referring to is by the fascist Ustaše regime under the
Nazi-controlled Independent State of Croatia. Between 1941 and 1945, as many as
half a million Serbians, Jews, and Roma (estimates vary widely) were systematically
executed in what is now a little-known genocide of the Second World War. See Mary
Kate Luft, 10 Facts About the Ustase Genocide, BORGEN PROJECT (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://borgenproject.org/facts-about-the-ustase-genocide/; see also, Slobodan
Milošević, supra note 30.
32 See Stephen Engelberg, Carving out a Greater Serbia, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 1,
1991), https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/01/magazine/carving-out-a-greaterserbia.html?auth=login-email&login=email.
33 See Peter Beaumont, Slobodan Milosevic Dies Alone with History Still Demanding
Justice,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
11,
2006),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/mar/12/warcrimes.milosevictrial.
34
ICTY, Milošević, Slobodan (IT-02-54), INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL
FOR
THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA
(2004),
https://www.icty.org/en/case/slobodan_milosevic#ind.
35 See History of Ethnic Tensions, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM,
https://www.ushmm.org/genocide-prevention/countries/bosniaherzegovina/case-study/background/history-ethnic-tensions (last visited Nov. 15,
2021).
36 See Sam Bramlett, What Was The Cause of the Bosnian War?, BORGEN
PROJECT (Jan. 6, 2018) https://borgenproject.org/cause-of-the-bosnianwar/#:~:text=Milosevic%20was%20a%20leader%20who,cause%20of%20the%20
Bosnian%20War.
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systematically executed over 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in
Srebrenica, a small town near the border of Serbia.37 Although
Srebrenica received most of the international attention, there were
dozens of recorded incidents of ethnic cleansing on all sides of the
conflict. In Bijeli Potok, up to 750 Bosniaks and Croats were
exterminated by Bosnian Serbs on the spot where Croatian fascists had
murdered Serbians during World War II.38 In the Doboj municipality,
the ICTY concluded that the Serbian attack on the local Bosniak and
Croat population was, “both widespread and systematic . . . with the
intent to discriminate against Muslims and Croats on the basis on their
ethnicity.”39 While the municipality had 43,000 Bosniaks recorded in
the 1993 census, only 1,000 remained at the signing of the Dayton
Accords, with over 2,000 missing or killed.40 In the town of Foča,
Serbian forces created ‘rape camps’ where they raped women and
young girls by the thousands as an “instrument of terror.” 41 Of the
40,000 Bosniaks living in Foča in 1992, only ten remained by the end
of the war.42
The Croats, because of their own hatred towards the Bosniaks
and the Serbians, waged atrocities of their own. The largest massacre
of Bosniaks perpetrated by the Croats was the Ahmići Massacre,
during which Croatian Defense Council (HVO) troops lit houses on
fire and killed civilians.43 Out of the 120 who died, thirty-two were
See
R.
Jeffrey
Smith,
Srebrenica
Massacre,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Srebrenica-massacre (last visited Nov. 15,
2021).
38 See Nick Thorpe, ‘Muslims Tortured? I Wasn’t There,’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 17,
2000), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/nov/18/balkans.
39
Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Župljanin, Case No. IT-08-91-T,
Judgement,
373
(Mar.
27,
2013),
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/zupljanin_stanisicm/tjug/en/130327-1.pdf.
40 See EDWARD LAWSON & MARY BERTUCCI, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 151 (TAYLOR & FRANCIS 1996).
41 See Facts About FOCA, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
https://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/jit_foca_en.pdf
(last
visit Nov. 15, 2021).
42 Id.
43 Kordić and Čerkez Verdict, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
(2004),
265,
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kordic_cerkez/acjug/en/cer-aj041217e.pdf.
37
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women and eleven were children under eighteen years of age. The
HVO artillery also destroyed mosques and culturally significant
Bosniak landmarks.44 In the Mostar municipality, Croatian forces set
up the Vojna camp which held tens of thousands of Bosniaks for
almost a year during the war.45 These illegally detained citizens were
subject to random killings, various forms of torture, rape, and
beatings.46 Croatian forces were also largely suspected to have carried
out most of the killings during the Bradina Massacre – a mass killing
of forty-eight Bosnian Serb civilians.47
The Bosniaks, for their part, also committed atrocities. The
largest massacre, the Kazani Pit Killings, occurred between April 1992
and October 1993.48 At least 150 ethnic Serbians were taken to the
Kazani Pit, beaten, and killed by Bosniaks who would usually slit their
throats and decapitate them before dumping their bodies in the pit.49
Another massacre perpetrated by the Bosniaks was in 1992, where the
Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina killed thirty to fifty
ethnic Serb civilians in what is referred to as the Čemerno massacre. 50
Bosniak forces also massacred Croat civilians – the most shocking
example of which is known as the Grabovica massacre, where at least
thirty-three Croats were murdered by Bosniaks near Jablanica.51

Id.
See View From The Hague, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
(Apr.
7,
2004)
https://www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/view_from_hague/balkan_040407_en.pdf.
46 See id.
47 See Lamija Grebo, Bosnia Charges Ex-Fighter with Crimes Against Konjic Serbs,
BALKANINSIGHT (Jun. 5, 2018), https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/05/bosniacharges-ex-fighter-with-crimes-against-konjic-serbs-06-05-2018/.
48 See Zdravko Ljubas, Fate Unknown: The Long Search for Sarajevo’s Missing
Serbs,
BALKANINSIGHT
(Aug.
1,
2019),
https://balkaninsight.com/2019/08/01/fate-unknown-the-long-search-forsarajevos-missing-serbs/.
49 See id.
50 See Dzana Brkanic, Bosnian Army Ex-Soldiers Arrested for Killing 30 Serbs,
BALKANINSIGHT
(Dec.
19,
2017),
https://balkaninsight.com/2017/12/19/bosnian-army-ex-soldiers-arrested-forkilling-30-serbs-12-19-2017/.
51 See Case Information Sheet Sefer Halilović, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA,
44
45
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When the Croats and Bosniaks eventually allied with each
other, their joint military fighting forces were also found to have
carried out war crimes against Serbians. The most gruesome example
of this was the Sijekovac massacre in March 1992.52 As many as fiftyeight Serbians were murdered by Croat and Bosniak forces who
knowingly targeted civilian centers with artillery.53 The dead included
over twenty children.54
The Bosnian War ended in 1995 and the survivors from all
ethnicities were essentially forced by the international community to
share the same border with those responsible for some form of ethnic
cleansing. Directly following the war, the Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs
felt a pure form of ethnic hatred towards each other, perpetuated by
the Dayton Accords, the framework that created the BiH government
structure and constitution.55
B. The Dayton Accords Maintaining Post-War Ethnic Tensions
BiH would not gain independence until 1995, after the United
States, under President Bill Clinton, helped streamline the international
recognition process for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Federation of BiH) and led NATO in bombing key positions of the
Republic of Srpska army.56 Known as Operation Deliberate Force, this
use of aggressive military intervention proved essential in stopping the
Bosnian War.57 However, the Republic of Srpska still had enough
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/halilovic/cis/en/cis_halilovic.pdf (last visited Nov.
15, 2021).
52
N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG., Main News Summary Wednesday, 11 August
2004,
PEACE
STABILISATION
FORCE
(Aug.
11,
2004),
https://www.nato.int/sfor/media/2004/ms040811.htm.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Ethnic Hatred Permeates Bosnia’s Bitter Peace, WASH.
POST
(Nov.
10,
2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/11/10/ethnic-hatredpermeates-bosnias-bitter-peace/4df048dc-0bc8-4b39-be5b-3fc8566e6696/.
56 See Ryan Hendrickson, Crossing the Rubicon, NATO REV. (Sept. 1, 2005),
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2005/09/01/crossing-therubicon/index.html.
57 See id.
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military and bargaining power to leverage its position in peace talks,
which began in Paris and finally concluded with the Dayton Peace
Agreement in November 1995.58 At this point, the international
community, still in disbelief of the unrestricted ethnic violence, would
accept nothing less than peace.59 The United States, many high-profile
E.U. nations, and even Russia pressured the presidents of Serbia,
Croatia, and the de-facto leaders of the Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and
Bosnian Serbs to negotiate peace.60 Several weeks of intense
discussions culminated in the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in
Ohio, creating the independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.61
The main goal of the Dayton Peace Accords, which the new
state of BiH accepted as their constitution, was to promote lasting
peace not only in BiH, but the entire Balkan region.62 Although peace
did follow, critics of the Dayton Accords claim that they maintained
ethnic tensions within BiH, and that the accords did little to rectify the
struggles of the Bosnian War, which was waged on the grounds of
deep-rooted ethnic hatred.63 The once diverse population of BiH was
now replaced with “ethnically defined areas” created from internal
displacement during the war.64

Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35
I.L.M. 75 [hereinafter GFAP].
59 See Ivo Daalder, Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended,
BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 1, 1998), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-tointervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/.
60
Christoph Schwegmann, The Contact Group and its Impact on the European
Institutional
Structure,
INST. FOR SEC. STUD.
4–8
(Jun
2000),
https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/occ016.pdf.
61
Off. for Democratic Inst. & Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Dayton
Peace Agreement, (1995), https://www.osce.org/bih/126173.
62 See
Bill
Clinton,
Dayton
Accords,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/event/Dayton-Accords (last updated Nov. 14, 2021).
63 See Julian Borger, Bosnia’s Bitter, Flawed Peace Deal, 20 Years On, GUARDIAN,
(Nov. 10, 2015) https://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/nov/10/bosnia-bitterflawed-peace-deal-dayton-agreement-20-years-on.
64 See Maja Sahadzic, The Electoral System of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Short
Review of Political Matter and/or Technical Perplexion, 2 CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 61, 62
(2009).
58
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Critics argue that the BiH governmental structure, created by
the Dayton Accords, is one of the most complicated and disturbing
examples of government organization in modern history.65 There are
five different presidents (three governing federally and two governing
the entities), fourteen separate parliaments, hundreds of
representatives, and over 130 appointed ministers for a country with
less land mass than West Virginia and a population lower than Los
Angeles.66 The second level of government below the federal
government contains three distinct autonomous entities whose
territories were drawn largely upon ethnic lines, including the
Federation of BiH, comprised mainly of Muslim Bosniaks and Bosnian
Croats and the Republic of Srpska, comprised mainly of Serbians.67 68
The Dayton Accords specifically granted these two entities
extraordinary autonomy which they still maintain: they are allowed
distinct foreign relations with other neighboring states, to provide for
their own security for their territory, and to maintain local jurisdiction
without interference from the other entity.69 This independence creates
tensions with the federal government, which also has the authority to
conduct foreign policy that does not always align with the wishes of
the ethnicities. Also, these entities have their own bicameral
parliament, prime minister, government, and president, which further

65 See Martin Walker, The Dayton Accords: A Peace Agreement for Bosnia – archive,
1995, GUARDIAN (Nov., 2, 1995), https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-thearchive-blog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosniaarchive-1995.
66 See Bosnia and Herzegovina: Government and Society, BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina/Government-andsociety (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
67 See Bosnia 2013 Census, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE,
https://epthinktank.eu/2014/01/27/bosnia-2013-census/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2021).
68
The third is the Brcko district, a self-governing administrative unit almost
200 square miles in size, which borders the Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina, the
Republic of Srpska, Croatia, and Serbia. Although it shares many of the same
responsibilities as the entities, Brcko is not particularly relevant to the direction of
this comment and will not be discussed further.
69
GFAP, supra note 58.
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complicate the roles, responsibilities, and overall effectiveness of the
political process.70
Many of the high-ranking federal positions also have an ethnic
requirement.71 For example, the three federal presidential seats are
uncompromisingly reserved for one Croat, one Serb, and one Bosniak,
dismissing the legal possibility of an ethnic minority presidential win.
This is the same for the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary
Assembly.72 In fact, the Dayton Accords name Croats, Bosniaks, and
Serbs as the only constituent peoples of BiH, barring any members of
the significant Roma and Jewish populations from high offices of
power.73 Further, the Dayton Accords maintain that constituent
peoples living in the opposite entity of their ethnicity are not allowed
to vote for their own ethnicity in federal elections.74 So, if a Bosnian
Serb lived in the Federation of BiH autonomous entity, a territory
where they are the ethnic minority, they would have no option to vote
for a Republic of Srpska presidential candidate – that right is only
reserved for citizens living in the Republic of Srpska voting in their
majority Serb entity.75 Likewise, a Croat or Bosniak living in the
Republic of Srpska would have to vote for a Croat or Bosnian
candidate to obtain a seat in parliament or the presidency.76 The use of
ethnicity as the main qualifying factor for high positions in government
is practically unheard of in the modern era, and BiH has been under
constant pressure to amend its constitution since its inception because
it has undoubtably perpetuated the continuation of ethnic tensions
since the end of the Bosnian War.77 Even in nations with specific
identity-based obligations for their heads of state, such as the nations

Id.
Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Bosnia’s Gordian Knot: Constitutional Reform, INT’L CRISIS GRP. (July 12,
2012),
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/balkans/bosnia-andherzegovina/bosnia-s-gordian-knot-constitutional-reform.
70
71
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of Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Morocco, religion – not ethnicity – is the
requirement.78
The presidential and parliamentary veto system also stoke the
flames of ethnic tension.79 If two presidents agree on an issue, they can
conditionally pass it if the parliament supports the decision.80
However, if the remaining president disagrees with the decision on the
simple grounds that it is ‘destructive’ to their ethnicity, they can veto
it.81 The same veto action is authorized in the two chambers of
parliament.82 It is clear that the BiH governmental structure is devised
to promote near unequivocal backing from all of the constituent
leaders for every decision, large or small, and this structure of the
governmental procedures has been the main factor in perpetuating
governmental gridlock.83
The adoption of the Dayton Accords as BiH’s constitutional
framework did not come close to addressing the underlying reasons
for ethnic tensions – it arguably exacerbated them.84 In the United
States, many factors contribute to an individual’s choice of political
ideology. History, family influence, personal experience, religion,
access to information, region, race, and ethnicity all play a role in an
individual’s political views.85 In BiH, however, for the vast majority of
Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croats, ethnicity alone drives

78 See Angelina Theodorou, In 30 Countries, Heads of State Must Belong to a
Certain Religion, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 22, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/07/22/in-30-countries-heads-of-state-must-belong-to-a-certainreligion/.
79 See Birgit Bahtic-Kunrath, Of Veto Players and Entity-Voting: Institutional
Gridlock in the Bosnian Reform Process, 39 J. NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY 899, 899
(2011).
80
GFAP, supra note 58.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83
Enna Zone Đonlić, Protection of the Vital National Interest in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, EUROPEAN STUDENT THINK TANK (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://esthinktank.com/2017/12/04/protection-of-the-vital-national-interest-inbosnia-and-herzegovina/.
84 See Clinton, supra note 62.
85 See
What
Factors
Shape
Political
Attitudes?,
US HIST.,
https://www.ushistory.org/gov/4b.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
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political ideology.86 In a functioning democracy, when individuals hold
ire towards their government for any reason, they do not direct it on
ethnic lines. In the United States, for example, when a government
shutdown occurs, Democrats, by and large, blame Republicans, and
vice versa.87 Because these political parties consist of a variety of
different ethnicities, religions, and points of view, the disapproval of
political leaders is primarily based on that ideology which manifests in
governmental action.88 On the other hand, the BiH constitution, as
created by the Dayton Accords, gave overwhelming power to the
political leaders of the three constituent ethnicities. When a Serbian
vetoes a proposed piece of executive action their ideology as well as
their ethnicity is blamed – in many ways, these two factors are
inextricably linked.89 Therefore, ethnic tension seems to be embedded
in BiH’s governmental structure, inarguably linking political struggles
to ethnic blame between all constituent peoples.

86 See Nils B. Weidmann, Measuring Ethnic Preferences in Bosnia and Herzegovina
with
Mobile
Advertising,
PLOS
ONE
(Dec.
22,
2016),
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0167779.
87 See Neil Malhotra & Alexander G. Kuo, Attributing Blame: The Public’s
Response to Hurricane Katrina, 70 J. OF POL. 120, 127 (2008) (A study conducted after
Hurricane Katrina found that mentioning political parties to citizens alters their
responses to blame the opposite party, regardless of race or ethnicity.).
88 See Trends in party affiliation among demographic groups, PEW RESEARCH, (Mar.
20, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03/20/1-trends-in-partyaffiliation-among-demographic-groups/.
89
More factors can be tied along with ideology and ethnicity. This includes
religion (most Bosnian Serbs are Orthodox Christian, most Bosnian Croats are
Catholic, and most Bosniaks are Muslims), lifestyle, and language. (Although SerboCroatian was the only official language of the Former Yugoslavia, since its
dissolution, the various languages of the three ethnicities have been individually
recognized: Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian respectively. However, the lexical
differences between the ethnicities are almost non-existent). See Sam Beford, A Guide
to
Religions
in
Bosnia,
CULTURE
TRIP
(Dec.
5,
2017),
https://theculturetrip.com/europe/bosnia-herzegovina/articles/a-guide-toreligions-in-bosnia/; see also DANKO ŠIPKA, LEXICAL LAYERS OF IDENTITY: WORDS,
MEANING, AND CULTURE IN THE SLAVIC LANGUAGES 166 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2019).
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C. Peace Without Victory
The Bosnian War did end, but not because one side was
militarily superior to another – the so-called “natural” cessation of
hostilities did not play out as it would have in a more traditional war.
Instead, it ended because of heavy involvement from the international
community. NATO militarily intervened under Operation Deliberate
Force, which crippled the army of the Republic of Srpska to end the
conflict after the primary U.N. peacekeeping missions failed.90 This
represented a “peace without victory,” for all sides.91 The Bosniaks did
not achieve a fully unitary state because two entities with a high level
of autonomy were established upon ethnic lines. Further, the Croats
and the Serbs did not gain independence or secede to Croatia and
Serbia, respectively.
A kind of peace was undoubtedly achieved between all
ethnicities, but with many reservations. First and foremost, no form of
ethnic unity was sought after the war. Instead, the two mostly
autonomous entities were drawn, and, more importantly, still remain
primarily on ethnic lines. When an official post-war census was finally
taken almost two decades after the war, the demographic makeup of
the two entities drew concern from the international community.92
Overall, the nation of BiH was comprised of 50.11% Bosniaks, 30.78%
Bosnian Serbs, and 15.43% Bosnian Croats. However, The Federation
of BiH hosted 91.39% of all the Bosnian Croats and 88.23% of all the
Bosniaks.93 Similarly, 92.11% of all the Bosnian Serbs resided within
the Republic of Srpska.94 This data shows that ethnic intermingling
remains rare to this day and partaking in it is culturally unacceptable.
BiH also has some of the worst economic problems in Europe.
BiH maintains one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the
90 See Barbara Crossette, U.N. Details Its Failure to Stop ‘95 Bosnia Massacre,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov., 16, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/16/world/undetails-its-failure-to-stop-95-bosnia-massacre.html.
91
Valery Perry, Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Does the Road to
Confederation Go Through the EU?, 22 INT’L PEACEKEEPING 490, 491 (2015).
92 See Bosnia 2013 Census, supra note 67.
93 Id.
94 Id.
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world – at the time of writing, it is 40.18%, while the global average is
15.5%.95 The estimated population in 2019 is at 3.3 million – this is
down from 4.5 million in 1988.96 Every year from 2000 – 2012, an
average of 20,000 emigrants have left BiH and that only counts for
emigrants going to other E.U. countries.97 Although emigration usually
provides some positive aspects for the sending country, so far
remittances and the shortening of the labor pool has done little in
strengthening the overall BiH economy and has an overall negative
impact for BiH’s economic future.98 Foreign investment, while higher
than North Macedonia and Montenegro, falls far shorter than other
more prosperous nations in the region such as Croatia and Slovenia.99
Although BiH’s GDP growth has been relatively stable for the past
decade, hovering around 2-3% growth, COVID-19 plummeted

See Unemployment, Youth Total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO
estimate)
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS?end=2020&locations=B
A&start=1991&view=chart (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
96
Most of the population decline happened between 1990 – 1997 and was
a direct result of the Bosnian War. The vast majority of Bosnian Croats who left
Bosnia went to Croatia, and the vast majority of Bosnian Serbians who left went to
Serbia. Bosniaks, for the most part, were internally displaced and receded towards
heavily-majority Bosniak cities and municipalities. See Population, total - Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
WORLD
BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=BA&display=gra
ph (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
97
Kačapor-Džihić and Oruč, Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban
Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, EUR. COMM’N (2012),
https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=8838&langId=en.
98
Amela Trokic, The Negative Long Term Effects of Remittance Inflow in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, 9 J. ANALYTICAL 58, 73 (2012).
99
Many of these fiscal investments do not come from ‘safe’ debtors. A
major investor in Bosnia & Herzegovina come from China, and the EU has noted
that these investments lead to continued problems within the country, such as
environmental threats and unpayable debts. See Hirkić, China in the Balkans – Part 1:
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina,
FOMOSO,
https://www.fomoso.org/en/mosopedia/background-knowledge/china-in-thebalkans-part-1-bosnia-and-herzegovina/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2021); see also Foreign
Direct Investment, Net Inflows (BoP, current US$) - Bosnia and Herzegovina, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=BA&m
ost_recent_value_desc=true&view=chart (last visited Nov. 15, 2021).
95
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Bosnia’s GDP growth to -6.5% in 2020.100 Also damning are BiH’s lack
of economic policy, which has provided no support for strategic
export industries, and BiH’s poor infrastructure system.101 BiH has no
broad policy for the economy or infrastructure because the two entities
cannot agree on broad policy nor its implementation.102 When the
economy suffers in most countries around the world, the people blame
their government first. In BiH, when the economy suffers, the Bosniak
and Croat citizens blame the Serbian political leaders, and Serbian
citizens blame Bosniak and Croat political leaders.
The Dayton Accords have enabled this political deadlock to
the obvious detriment of BiH citizens.103 Many critics realized that
handing significant executive power, in the form of presidential vetoes,
to the various ethnicities could weaponize the political environment
and enflame ethnic tensions.104 Looking at BiH today, the fears of the
past were well founded. Presidential and the Parliamentary Assembly’s
veto power allows politicians to use veto power for the constituent
people’s own insular ethnic interest, and throughout the 25 years since
the war ended, veto power has been used for that sole purpose in most
cases.105 In a large way, the Bosnian War is still being bitterly fought by
all ethnicities, not with soldiers in the battlefield, but with politicians
perpetually vying for their own specific ethnic interests. The pen might
be mightier than the sword, but a pen without a guiding hand leaves

100 Bosnia & Herzegovina: Growth Rate of the Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
from 2015 to 2025, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/453929/grossdomestic-product-gdp-growth-rate-in-bosnia-herzegovina/ (last visited Nov. 15,
2021).
101 See Alberto Arenaza, Bosnia and its Constitution. Thoughts on Reform and
Governance,
THE
MEDIUM
(Nov.
10,
2017),
https://medium.com/@albertoarenaza/bosnia-and-its-constitution-thoughts-onreform-and-governance-afff837ed49a.
102 Id.
103 See Barrie Barber, Gridlock Keeps Bosnia Paralyzed Today, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/gridlock-keepsbosnia-paralyzed-today/2SmD7M4fQi6ivJMYLYdaqL/.
104 See Peter Cannon, The Third Balkan War and Political Disunity: Creating a
Confederated Cantonal Constitutional System, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 373, 411 (1995).
105
Bahtic-Kunrath, supra note 79.
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an empty page, and, in this case, a stagnate nation facing the real
possibility of secession.
III. ANALYSIS: COURT RULINGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
INTERNATIONAL NORMS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A. International Community: Secession as a Political Matter
In the international community, recognition of the secessions
of peoples has not been consistent, to say the least. A good rule of
thumb clearly outlined by international law professor Hurst Hannum,
is that secession is most likely supported only if, but not always when,
a people is held under extreme and dire persecution from their
government and if the seceding party is prepared for selfgovernance.106 Any other case where secession is attempted, it is simply
a political matter. International law, for example, generally supports
secession in various recognized codified legislation and charters. The
UN Charter, which 193 nations have accepted as international law,
grants international “respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.”107 However, there are many limits to the
UN Charter’s declaration that peoples have a right to selfdetermination. The broad language of the UN Charter regarding selfdetermination, in theory, gives the right for self-determination to
practically any minority living in any nation. This right would most
certainly end in the Balkanization and conflict of peoples of nations all
around the world. However, the text of the UN Charter regarding selfdetermination is refuted by the Charter’s guarantee of the territorial
integrity of a state.108 This type of contradictory language scattered
throughout the UN Charter regarding the right of self-determination
was most certainly intentional because the founders of this document
106 See generally Hurst Hannum, The Right of Self-Determination in the Twenty First
Century, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 773 (1998).
107
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International
Court of Justice, UNITED NATIONS (last updated
June 2020),
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I1&chapter=1&lang=en. See also, U.N. Charter art. 2.
108 See Micheli Quadros, Secession: The Contradicting Provisions of the United
Nations Charter - A Direct Threat to the Current World Order, 14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L
L. 461, 462 (2016).
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did not want continual ethnocentric minority secession movements all
around the world, a point made by Vernon Van Dyke back in 1969.109
Van Dyke also states that nearly all nations will promote selfdetermination if related to colonial subjects, but at the same time
would not support non-colonial independence movements if they
counter a national security objective and/or are internal.110 There are a
plethora of cases of the former, such as President Johnson’s military
intervention during the Dominican Republic independence movement
in 1962 and U.S. initiation of the Vietnam War.111 In both of these
cases, the United States wanted to prevent the spread of
Communism.112 There are also many cases for the latter. One of the
most famous modern examples is Israel’s denial of Palestinian
independence. However, internal secession has historically been
accepted in some circumstances. In the context of Yugoslavia, the
independence of BiH was grudgingly accepted by what was left of
Yugoslavia after the international community, led by the United States,
used strategic and devastating military force against the Republic of
Srpska. Obviously, for states around the world, the support or
opposition of secessionist movements are reliant on certain
circumstances – there is no legal norm even when certain “rights” or
“principles” are guaranteed under international law. This evidently
makes international support of secession movements political, not
legal, in nature as individual states are inclined to take a stance that
meets their prior objectives in the region.113
Therefore, the political factors surrounding the Republic of
Srpksa must be examined to determine if they have any real chance to
secede. Since the end of the Bosnian War and the establishment of
See Vernon Van Dyke, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 13 INT’L
STUD. Q. 223, (Sept. 1969).
110 Id.
111 See U.S. troops land in the Dominican Republic in attempt to forestall a “communist
dictatorship” HISTORY.COM (Apr. 28, 1965), https://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/u-s-troops-land-in-the-dominican-republic; see also Reasons for US involvement
in Vietnam, BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zv7bkqt/revision/2 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2021).
112 Id.
113
This article uses the terms “secession,” “self-determination,” and
“independence” interchangeably, as do many international charters regarding the
rights of a people to be sovereign.
109
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BiH, the United States and the European Union have unilaterally
opposed the Republic of Srpska’s independence. First, U.S. and E.U.
support of the secessionist movement would peripherally acknowledge
the failures of the Dayton Accords brokered by the two parties. At the
time of its signing, the Western countries were given large international
credit for creating peace between the ethnicities of BiH.114 To discard
this agreement would highlight its failure at promoting a unitary state.
Another reason for the U.S. and E.U. non-approval comes from the
belief of U.S. and E.U. leaders that such an independence cannot occur
without ethnic violence and additional regional tensions.115 Together,
these two reasons explain many instances of U.S. and E.U. rejection of
the secessionist movement. In 2008, the United States cut funding for
the Bosnian-Serb political party pushing for a referendum on
independence and the E.U. publicly condemned the party.116 In 2011,
the Republic of Srpska’s referendum proposal was defused by the E.U.,
with aid from the United States.117 In the 2015 call for a referendum,
the E.U. and United States made clear that if the Republka Srpska
gained independence, it would be economically isolated.118
Is the political landscape in the United States and E.U.
changing? Certainly. The United States, under former President
Trump, adopted a new “America First strategy” that has been
supportive of traditional European alliances. The 2017 National
Security Strategy explicitly states that “The United States seeks strong
partners, not weak ones,” and is actively pursuing foreign policy that
is “prioritizing the interests of our citizens and protecting our

See Martin Walker, No war crimes deal, vows US, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 2,
1995),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archiveblog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosnia-archive1995.
115 See BIDELEUX supra, note 5.
116
Daria Sito-Sucic, United States Cuts Aid to Bosnian Serb Ruling Party,
REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosnia-usa/unitedstates-cuts-aid-to-bosnian-serb-ruling-party-idUSL0471748020080304.
117 Bosnia: What Does Republic of Srpska Want?, supra note 16.
118 Political Risk Analysis – Republic of Srpska: How Likely is Independence, FITCH
SOLUTIONS (Feb. 26, 2016).
114

270

2021

The Road to Independence

10:1

sovereign rights as a nation.”119 It is very likely that if the Republic of
Srpska did secede, the new Federation of BiH nation would seek to
join NATO, as BiH’s only impediment to NATO entry are the
Bosnian Serbs, who dislike the idea of joining the organization that
bombed them during the Bosnian War.120 Barring any sort of conflict
or regional instability resulting from the Republic of Srpska’s
secession, the United States under this national security strategy would
welcome a new member to NATO if, of course, the eligibility
requirements would be met.121 Although President Biden is currently
promoting a more global strategy for the United States122, the America
First strategy could certainly be one that is followed by future
Republican leaders, and so the Republic of Srpska may get their
support for secession in as little as four years if a populist Republican
once again holds the presidency. However, both the United States
troop withdrawal from Afghanistan and the US-Australia nuclear
submarine deal arguably represented an “America First” strategy, albeit
a watered down one.123 Despite the wishes of the international
community, regarding Afghanistan, and France, regarding the
submarine deal, the United States acted entirely in their own interests
and disregarded traditional international diplomatic alliances in the

National Security Strategy of the United States of America, WHITE HOUSE 39
(Dec.
18,
2017),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
120 See Rasid Krupalija, Bosniak Leader: Bosnian Serbs Will Eventually Agree to
Join
NATO,
BALKAN
INSIGHT
(Jan.
28,
2020),
https://balkaninsight.com/2020/01/28/bosniak-leader-bosnian-serbs-willeventually-agree-to-join-nato/.
121 See Daria Sito-Sucic, U.S. backs NATO membership for Bosnia, dismisses Serb
opposition, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bosniausa-nato/u-s-backs-nato-membership-for-bosnia-dismisses-serb-oppositionidUSKBN1OG238.
122
President Joseph Biden, Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place
in the World (Feb. 4, 2021) available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americasplace-in-the-world/.
123 See David A. Graham, Biden’s ‘America First’ Policy on Afghanistan, THE
ATLANTIC
(Aug.
16,
2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/08/biden-afghanistan-addresschaos-exit/619773/.
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process.124 Whether these actions by the U.S. are in any way
emblematic of the future under Democrat leadership remains to be
seen.
Generally, the E.U.’s stance on Republic of Srpska is more
complex and varies from country to country. As some E.U. politicians
have admitted, the E.U. rarely has a directed foreign policy since it is
an international body with sovereign members which is likely to
continue post-Brexit.125 Even within Europe’s own borders, the E.U.
often fails to respond directedly, as was the case with the E.U.’s lack
of strong action following the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by
Russia.126 However, if the recent explosion of voter support for
nationalist parties continues, there exists potential for further
Balkanization and irrelevancy of the Bloc. 127 Still, enough countries
within the E.U. have thus far opposed Serbian secession, and the E.U.
has formally spoken in protest to the Republic of Srspka’s calls for
secession, as peace within the European border is a priority to most
nations in the E.U.128 Nonetheless, the E.U.’s stance does not look to
change in the near future. It must be noted that the inaction of the
E.U. following Russia’s annexation of Crimea could indicate that the
EU might be unwilling to use any type of force short of economic
sanctions in the Balkans.

124 See Roger Cohen, In Submarine Deal With Australia, U.S. Counters China but
Enrages
France,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/16/world/europe/france-australia-uk-ussubmarines.html (last updated Nov. 9, 2021).
125 See Pavol Szalai, There is No Real ‘European Foreign Policy’, Says Former EU
diplomat, EURACTIV (June 14, 2019), https://www.euractiv.com/section/europeanexternal-action-service/interview/there-is-no-real-european-foreign-policy-saysformer-eu-diplomat/.
126 See Katya Kruk, The Crimean Factor: How the European Union Reacted to
Russia’s Annexation of Crimea, WARSAW INST. REV. (May 7, 2019),
https://warsawinstitute.org/crimean-factor-european-union-reacted-russiasannexation-crimea/.
127 See Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide, BBC (Nov.
13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006; see also, Leonardo
Scuira, Brexit Beyond Borders: Beginning of the EU Collapse and Return to Nationalism, 70 J.
INT’L AFFS. 109, 109 (2017).
128
Kovacevic, supra note 4.
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However, even if the broader global community supports the
secession movement, there are many legal challenges that will make
secession a truly laborious process. For example, the Dayton Accords
itself does not explicitly give a right for future secession by either
party.129 Interestingly, while secession is not mentioned once in the
Dayton Accords, there is an emphasis on the international illegality of
either entities from conducting military action against one other, unless
it is agreed upon by all members of the presidency.130 In this context,
hostile, or perhaps even non-hostile, secession would be illegal in the
Dayton Accords.
B. International Court Rulings and Continual Violations of Human
Rights of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Government
However, as mentioned previously, there are major problems
with the Dayton Accords. First, the Dayton Accords were drafted with
the hope that the parties within BiH would amend it, along with its
constitution.131 The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) has outlined this fact in its 2006 ruling in BiH.
Specifically, it notes that the committee is aware that BiH’s constitution
and laws were created by the Dayton Accords, which was arguably
necessary “on an interim basis.”132 However, twenty-five years have
passed since its implementation, and the Accords still have not been
changed in any significant manner.133
The BiH governmental structure created by the Dayton
Accords has routinely been found to violate basic human rights
towards its citizens. In 2002, the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights ruled that the BiH constitution had enshrined
ethnicity-based restraints that impede upon certain citizens’ rights to
GFAP, supra note 58.
Id.
131
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD),
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention :
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination : Concluding
Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination : Bosnia and
Herzegovina,
CERD/C/BIH/CO/6
(Apr.
11,
2006),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4537797be.html.
132 Id.
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vote and participate in higher government positions.134 This ruling was
directly presented to the BiH government. Therefore, the BiH
government knew formally that their constitution was in violation of
fundamental and internationally recognized human rights since 2002,
although it could be argued that they were aware that their constitution
broke international law since the creation of the state in 1995.
The first international court ruling formally stating that BiH
violated human rights was in 2005 by the European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). ECRI found that although
BiH was taking to address minority rights, “severe problems of racism
and racial . . . discrimination and segregation persist in the country,
often as a result of nationalist policies pursued by ethnically based
political parties.”135 Specifically, the ECRI found a strong link
“between the enjoyment of rights and ethnic affiliation,” which
“makes it difficult for those not belonging to locally or nationally
dominant ethnic groups to access rights and opportunities in many of
these areas,” while noting that the current constitution, created from
the Dayton Accords, “allocates certain important rights on an explicit
ethnic basis.”136 The ECRI recommended the BiH government take
action to amend the existing laws to fight racism, ensure its
implementation, ensure minority participation in governmental
institutions, and move away from the ethnocentric governmental
structure revolving around the Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs.137 Overall,
this ECRI report echoes the same ethnocentric concerns that were
found before and during the Bosnian War ten years earlier.
That same year, the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission) issued recommendations based on
their fact-finding mission on the electoral process of BiH. Within the
Federation of BiH, the Venice Commission found that there was wide
134
Off. for Democratic Inst. & Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Bosnia and
Herzegovina, General Elections 5 October 2002, Final Report, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2002),
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/4/14001.pdf.
135 , Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUR. COMM’N AGAINST RACISM &
INTOLERANCE 6 (Feb. 15, 2005), https://rm.coe.int/first-report-on-bosnia-andherzegovina/16808b55fc.
136 Id. at 2, 6.
137 Id. at 1.
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interest in reforming the Dayton constitution, which violates several
international laws and norms.138 The first major step to constitutional
reform, in the eyes of the Venice commission, was abolishing the two
entities and establishing fully one state.139 This unification, however,
was vehemently opposed by the Republic of Srpska.140 The Venice
Commission stated that, “[a]bandoning the [Republic of Srpska entity]
would be regarded by all Serbs as equivalent to defeat in the [Bosnian]
war and mean that all sacrifices had been in vain.”141 The Venice
Commission further asserted that a major impediment to
constitutional reform was that ethnic identity, especially regarding the
presidential veto power, inherently disregards non-constituents from
either entity.142 In sum, for constitutional reform to occur, the entities
must be abolished in favor of one united BiH, and the major
impediment specifically is the ethnocentric style of governing by all
constituent peoples which is exactly what the Venice Commission
recommended in the conclusion.143 However, this fact-finding report
neglects the possibility of the Republic of Srpska secession. If the
Republic of Srpska could find a way to peacefully secede into their own
nation on the basis of transforming, or creating anew, their current
constitution in the name of human rights, and step away from an
ethnocentric governing style, they could fulfill these recommendations
– and others – to adhere fully to international laws and norms.
In October 2006, the first general elections in BiH were fully
administered without the help of the international community.144 The
138
Eur. Comm’n for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),
Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High
Representative,
COUNCIL
OF
EUR.
11-2
(Mar.
11,
2005),
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDLAD(2005)004-e.
139 Id. at 5.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 17-8.
143 Id. at 25.
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Off. for Democratic Inst. & Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Bosnia and
Herzegovina General Elections 1 October 2006 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Final
Report,
at
1,
(Feb.
6,
2007),
https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/c/7/23945.pdf. As a note, this claim was
made without a proper ruling by the ECHR.
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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
claimed that the elections ran smoothly, but also highlighted that since
the BiH constitution imposed “ethnicity-based limitations to the right
to stand for office, the elections were in violation of Protocol No. 12
to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the
commitments made to the Council of Europe, and Article 7.3 of the
OSCE 1990 Copenhagen Document.”145 Although there was no
formal ruling by the ECHR of any violation of their protocols, as this
was an OSCE ruling, Protocol No. 12 was ratified by BiH in 2003. 146
Protocol No. 12 of the EHCR states that domestic law must be granted
to citizens without any discrimination based on, among other things,
ethnicity.147 Two years later, Ilijaz Pilav, a Bosniak living in the
Republic of Srpska, was denied the ability to run for president in the
Republic of Srpska. He sued, and the case was decided by the BiH
Constitutional Court. The court maintained that constitutional
provisions denying Pilav from running for the president of the
Republic of Srpska did not violate ECHR Protocol No. 12 because, in
the words of the Court:
The impugned measures, while restrictive, were not
discriminatory because they had an objective and
reasonable justification: they served a legitimate aim –
namely the establishment and preservation of peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina – and were reasonably
proportionate to that aim.148

Id.
Second Class Citizens: Discrimination against Roma, Jews, and Other National
Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Apr. 4, 2012),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/04/04/second-class-citizens/discriminationagainst-roma-jews-and-other-national#.
147
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(2013),
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Another argument from the court was that the discrimination
applies equally to all the constituent and non-constituent peoples.149
Even to the members of the Court, it would be obvious that the
barring of Pilav from running for presidency in the Republic of Srpska
is fundamentally against the ECHR Protocol No. 12. In what would
seem like a ploy against any conversation around constitutional reform,
however, the Constitutional Court used the threat of conflict and the
maintenance of peace as reasons that the inherently discriminatory
constitutional provision did not violate ECHR Protocol No. 12.150
The OSCE, in the same 2007 report, also noted that the
election “was marked by sharp nationalist rhetoric and occasional
inflammatory statements from key election contestants.”151 However,
the overall tone of the OSCE document is hopeful and they mention
that “the general impression was that the elections were held in an
overall positive environment and there were many examples of polling
station commissioners taking considerable trouble to enable voters to
exercise their democratic rights.”152 The report ends with explicit
recommendations for constitutional changes: “provisions of the
constitution . . . that discriminate against certain citizens on the basis
of their ethnicity should be eliminated. All citizens of BiH should have
the right to stand for any office or to vote on equal terms.”153 As was
true before, the BiH government still took no step towards
constitutional reform. Earlier in 2006, a vote that would amend the
constitution failed in the Parliament of BiH by two votes.154 The vote
also considered rewriting the veto system and the ethnic voting
requirement enshrined in the constitution.155 The Parliamentary
Assembly, which was being observed by the Monitoring Committee of
Id. at ¶ 33.
Id.
151
Off. for Democratic Inst. & Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), Bosnia and
Herzegovina General Elections 1 October 2006 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Final Report, supra note 134, at 1.
152 Id. at 3.
153 Id. at 24.
154 Report of the Monitoring Committee on Constitutional reform in Bosnia and
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2006),
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the Council of Europe, urged leaders to again vote on some form of
constitutional change. Although votes did occur in the later years, none
were successfully passed.156
Later in 2006, the UN Committee on Human Rights
(OHCHR) recommended that the BiH government should “reopen
talks on the constitutional reform in a transparent process and on a
wide participatory basis . . . with a view to adopting an electoral system
that guarantees equal enjoyment of rights under Article 25 of the
Covenant to all citizens irrespective of ethnicity.”157 Article 25 of the
OHCHR guarantees citizens of all member-states the right to an
adequate standard of living, specifically regarding food, water,
sanitation, medical care, etc.158 The committee received reports that the
Roma in particular were being subjected to violence and
discrimination. There was also a “lack of information in the State
party’s report on the opportunities for the Roma to receive instruction
in and of their language and on their culture.”159 At the time, the Roma
were thought to be the largest non-constituent minority in BiH, and
discrimination against them would become a common theme of
consideration for international courts in the future.160 This report in
particular showed that ethnic minorities in BiH were not only barred
from political power, but were also denied basic financial and
substantive human rights from the government. The Dayton Accords
constitution had, according to the OHCHR report, enabled this.161
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By 2008, the Roma were “the poorest, the least educated and
employed, and faced the most discrimination in accessing basic
services that they need to survive.”162 According to the Human Rights
Watch, in 2008 BiH signed on to the “Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005
- 2015” which was a commitment by European countries to improve
the overall status of the Roma population.163 However, by 2012, BiH
had failed to demonstrate any tangible progress towards the
empowerment of its Roma citizens, other than a watered down antidiscrimination law passed in 2009.164 The law itself had strong
provisions that sought to provide “equal rights and opportunities to all
persons in [Bosnia and Herzegovina].”165 However, it did little in
combatting the discrimination against the Roma, as virtually no
national minorities brought up cases under the law – Human Rights
Watch speculates that this lack of cases could be explained by the
national minorities’ poor understanding of the law.166 Also, the law
directly contradicts the BiH constitution, and the Constitutional Court
would undoubtedly use the Dayton Accords and the peace argument
threats to uphold the status of the constitution. More recently,
Amnesty International’s annual report of BiH in 2019 stated that
“Roma continued to face systemic barriers to education, housing,
health services, and employment,” and in 2020, the Human Rights
Watch found that only “limited progress” was attained for improving
those areas for the Roma since recommendations were made in the
2000s. 167 The lack of constitutional reform ensures that this
discrimination against the Roma will continue in the future.
In 2009, the ECHR made its decision on whether the BiH
electoral structure violated any ECHR protocols. Sejdic, a Roma, and
Finci, a Jew, both contested the BiH Constitutional ruling that did not
Second Class Citizens, supra note 146.
Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
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167 See Bosnia and Herzegovina 2019 Annual Report, AMNESTY INT’L,
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allow non-constituent persons to hold positions of high offices in the
government, including the presidential seats for each entity.168 In a
ruling of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ECHR found that
the inability for either non-constituent person to run for president was
a direct violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 and Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 of the EHCR Convention.169 This was upheld because
the applicants had “experience comparable to the highest elected
officials,” yet were still prevented for running for high offices.170 Also,
Finci, a Jewish citizen, was denied not because his ethnicity, but
because of his religion.171 The BiH government responded that its rules
were not discriminatory and claimed that the Dayton Constitution did
not discriminate against Sejdic nor Finci because they could vote and
hold seats in the lower parliament.172 The BiH government also
claimed that even if the measures were discriminatory, “there were
objective and legitimate justifications for limitations on their
democratic rights,” to maintain the “preservation of peace and
achiev[e] representation of all three ‘Constituent Peoples.’”173
Nevertheless, the EHCR ruled that the Constitution was
discriminatory, and the BiH government were now informed by
perhaps the most significant international court yet that their
constitution was in direct violation of international laws and norms.174
In 2011, the BiH failed to negotiate a government.175 This was
the year that Dodik, with wide support from the Republic of Srspka
168
Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. No. 27996/06 and
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22,
2009),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22860268%22],%22it
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170 See Lucy Claridge, Discrimination and political participation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, MINORITY RTS. GRP. 3 (Jan.,
2010),
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parliament, threatened seccession.176 According to The Guardian, 2011
was perhaps the highest moment of tension since the ending of the
war and the Human Rights Watch blamed the problems stemming
from the codification of the Dayton Accords as the reason for the
political gridlock, which has kept ethnic tensions alive.177 Even the
Bosnian Croats threatened seccession when their proposal for the
establishment of a Croat majority entity was rejected by the Bosniaks
and Serbs.178 According to the latest annual report from the Human
Rights Watch, the BiH has not seriously attempted constitutional or
legal reform since 2011.179
These reports and court findings all point to a common theme.
The BiH government has been notified of their continual violations of
human rights by the constitutional structure created by the Dayton
Accords since the creation of the state 1995. However, the BiH
government has only taken negligible steps to reform their
constitution, which allows legal discrimination for national minorities.
C. Reasons for Failure of Dayton Constitutional Amendment Reform
The failures of the BiH Government to implement
amendments to its constitution stems from a variety of complex issues.
First, the BiH government has cited that since its Constitution was
established under the Dayton Peace Agreement, it does not have the
authority to amend it, nor “bear the responsibility of any breach of the
ECHR” or any other international legal court’s or committee’s
convents or laws.180 However, the E.U. and the U.S. have repeatedly
said that this is not the case, and the BiH government has the ability
and full sovereignty to administer constitutional reform.181
Theoretically, if all parties agreed, the government could completely
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/28/bosnia-crisis-serb-leaderreferendum.
176 Id.
177 Second Class Citizens, supra note 146.
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180
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replace the Dayton Accords with another binding agreement at any
time.182 Overall, this argument does not hold up under legal scrutiny
because they have unquestionable authority to vote on and implement
constitutional reform. Still, this fact has not stopped high level
governmental institutions of BiH, such as the Constitutional Court,
from using it as an excuse.
Second, there are no incentives for BiH politicians to lead
constitutional reform initiatives. The Republic of Srpska has
specifically sought to maintain the status quo in the recent decades.183
All three constituent peoples in BiH have adopted nationalistic
rhetoric indicating that any political negotiation – including
constitutional reform – is a continuation of the Bosnian War.184
Further, both political entities do not want to cede powers for the sake
of constitution reform, even when it is required to ascend into the
E.U.185 If constitutional reform occurred in the manner required to
ascend into the E.U., both the Federation of BiH and the Republic of
Srpska would transfer power to non-constituent peoples, who could
then be elected to higher positions of power, espouse interests contrary
to the constituent peoples, and thus hinder their political “war” efforts
after the termination of the Bosnian War.186 Power centralization
around the constituent peoples, therefore, seems to be a main cause of
the dysfunction and the overall negative attitude towards constitutional
reform. In this context, the tired euphemism “those in power want to
stay in power,” applies.
Third, constitutional reform would be an extremely difficult
task if BiH would seek to fully adhere to international law, a definite
Id.
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prerequisite to E.U. accession.187 The constitution would have to be
completely transformed with amendments that not only change the
constitution, but the entire workings of institutions of BiH. This
includes, on the federal level, the transformation of the “Constitutional
Court, the parliament, the Council of Ministers,” and the statistical
agencies, just to name a few.188 In addition, many institutions
administered by the entities would need to be changed.189 Domestic
laws would also need to be reformed. The most glaring law that breaks
international law is BiH’s election law.190 Further, all of the changes
need to be in accordance of the rulings by international courts, such as
the ECHR’s Sejdic-Finci ruling.191 An additional impediment to
constitutional reform is the translation of the document – currently
only binding in English – into Bosnian.192 The Bosnian language, like
some other Slavic languages in the former Yugoslav Republics, is
written with both Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, and direct translation of
words and phrases from English is often ambiguous. If such a
translation from English to Bosnian were to occur, many
disagreements on the exact translations of certain words or phrases
would arise by the various leaders from the two entities prone to
political bickering, throwing yet another roadblock into constitutional
reform.
Fourth, and perhaps the most troublesome, is rampant
corruption in all levels of government. The corruption is so ingrained
and widespread that some, like Bodo Weber, Senior Associate of the
Democratization Policy in Berlin, argue that the “un-reformable public
administration,” including the Dayton-instituted constitution, is “an

See European Union, Accession Criteria, EUR. COMM’N,
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instrument of state capture.”193 Weber continues with a succinct and
poignant perspective on the scale of corruption within BiH. The term
“state capture” in this context is defined as the control of a nation’s
institutions by political factions who hold a disproportionate advantage
in keeping power.194 This type of state capture is maintained in BiH
due to a variety of reasons, but the main one is nepotism. As Weber
notes, “[p]ublic administrations are still staffed by relatives and friends
of those in power,” and even though “formal educational criteria”
became a requirement, private universities offer “sons and daughters
of politicians and connected businessmen” the opportunity to buy
diplomas without participating in classes.195 The economy is dependent
on this public administration system by as much as 80%.196 Since there
is an inextricable link between the corrupt, nepotic institutions and the
economy, a broad reform to the constitution, or any laws based on the
constitution, could threaten BiH’s fragile economy, which incentivizes
maintenance of the status quo. In a sense, the economy is being held
hostage by the corrupt structure of the BiH government. Weber ends
by saying what scholars have recommended for decades: “[public
administration/constitutional reform] can only happen with . . . the
international community . . . shifting finally to a serious approach in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.”197 This international community that Weber is
hopeful for has now failed for twenty-five years to incentivize or
materialize any real change in BiH, even before E.U.’s Brexit and the
US’ America First national strategy. If the international community
failed in the past to push for constitutional change in BiH, it will
continue to fail as it now holds, and will likely hold in the near future,
relatively weakened power than it had in the past.
IV. THE PATH FOR SUCCESSFUL REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA SECESSION
One final question remains: is it possible for the Republic of
Srpska to secede from the BiH? The research analysis indicates that
Bodo Weber, BiH’s un-Reformable Public Administration – an Instrument of
State Capture, PERSPECTIVES –SE. EUR. Sept. 2017, at 10.
194 Id. at 11.
195 Id. at 12.
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197 Id. at 14.
193

284

2021

The Road to Independence

10:1

there are paths the Republic of Srpska could take that would give it a
good chance to gain internationally recognized independence through
secession. First, certain criteria must be met, such as a cleanly
democratic referendum of independence. If the will of the Serbian
people in the Republic of Srpska overwhelmingly supports an
independent Republic of Srpska, that consensus will create a strong
basis for internationally recognized independence, even if threats are
given by the E.U. or the United States. For example, the United States
and E.U. both supported the referendum for South Sudanese
independence in 2011.198 The referendum and independence of South
Sudan met international standards and former President Obama said
the vote was “inspiring” because the South Sudanese had “decided
their future” with the vote.199 Even when violence resulted from the
results of the referendum, the international community still largely
supported the movement and formally recognized South Sudan as a
nation-state.200 Although the parallels between these two movements
are not plentiful, secession of a nation must begin with the consent of
the general population.
Next, the Republic of Srpska cannot use military force even in
defense. If the Republic of Srpska does not use any force after declaring
their seccession, the international community will likely support them,
especially if the Federation of BiH initiates and sustains military
conflict against the Serbians. Although the United States and the E.U.
used military intervention against the Republic of Srpska before, it was
arguably because the Serbians were responsible for the most callous
acts of ethnic cleansing and genocide during the Bosnian War, such as
Srebrenica, and the Serbians were painted as the villains because of
Milosevic’s actions during the Yugoslavian disintegration.201 This time
however, the international community would be forced to recognize
that the Serbians, not the Bosniaks or Croats, are the victims of what
198
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could be a cruel, one-sided military conflict. If the Republic of Srpska
used military action to secure their independence, they would likely not
even be supported by their Bosnian Serbian population. A poll from
2015 shows that only a mere 1.7% of Serbians would support secession
of the Republic of Srpska through violent means, with the vast
majority saying they would peacefully protest to obtain
independence.202
However, widespread and sustained non-military ethnic
violence would likely not occur in any great capacity. The same poll
from 2015 shows that 27.6% of Bosnian Respondents would do
nothing, 57.1% said they would peacefully protest such a secession
attempt, 5.9% responded they would violently protest, and 4.3% said
they would take up arms.203 While the promise of violence from over
10% of the Bosnian population is alarming, it remains clear that these
individuals are in the minority, and their violent actions would likely
be condemned by their fellow citizens, political leaders, and the
regional/international community. The majority of people who
responded that they would either violently protest or take up arms fell
into the age range of 36-50.204 If the United States is any indication, the
average age of an enlisted soldier is 27 years old, which makes the
threat of serious and sustained violence in BiH following a Serbian
secession unlikely due to the aging population in favor of violence.205
This poll also signifies how important generational change will affect
potential success of future secession attempts made by the Republic of
Srpska. Perhaps the young, whose government has failed in nearly
202
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every aspect in its twenty-five year existence, are more willing to accept
the magnitude of change created by the peaceful separation between
BiH’s two entities.
Next comes the reasoning and framing of secession. Prior
secession threats from the Republic of Srpska have all had nationalistic
and ethnocentric overtones. If framed differently, the international
community would have a hard time condemning such calls. The most
obvious way to call for seccession would be through the framework of
constitutional, governmental, and legal reform which promises human
rights loudly demanded by the international community since 2002.206
Bosnian Serb political leaders could lament the fact that nearly every
attempt at reform in BiH on the basis of human rights has failed
miserably.207 Further, they compare the wide ranging and systemic
disagreements on reform implementation between Republic of Srpska
and the Federation of BiH political leaders with the absence of
disagreement among Republic of Srpska politicians on the same
matters.208 The Republic of Srpska could draft sweeping reforms
promising a complete overhaul or transformation of the constitution
which would eliminate constituent peoples, update immigration laws,
enshrine minority participation in high offices of government, change
the election law, and revise all other legal codifications that would – if
implemented and followed – satisfy the international community’s
recommendations, court decisions, human rights concerns, and E.U.
ascension requirements. These reforms would likely be dismissed by
the Bosniaks and Croats, showing the international community that
even if the Bonsian Serbs wanted to act in accordance with
international law, their counterparts do not. The Serbian politicians
could then say that, given the full power of a state, away from the
seemingly eternal gridlock structure of BiH government, the reform
process could finally be implemented, and the same could be assumed
about the Federation of BiH. Further, the autonomy they already
maintain demonstrates they have the capability to function as a nationstate. Together, both entities will remain in violation of international
law. Separated, there is a path for real change and reform. That
206
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narrative, arguably, will be the most effective at strengthening the
Republic of Srpska’s chances to become independent. The question of
whether the politicians or citizens of the Republic of Srpska would
actually want to act in accordance with international law is a topic for
another paper, and more research needs to be conducted. My educated
guess is that the Serbian politicians will echo the will of their people,
as they have done for decades past, and move forward with the
secession attempts if their citizens demand it.
Finally, the Republic of Srpska should not push for
combination with Serbia in the near future, as this would feed into
fears of a Greater Serbia, the idea that the state of Serbia exists
wherever there is a Serbian majority, not defined by historically
represented boundaries of Serbia. Although it has been decades since
Serbia was in a position to pursue a Greater Serbia, Serbia’s current
president, Aleksander Vučić, is a former ultranationalist turned liberal
populist who has praised Milošević as “a great Serbian leader,” whose
intentions were “certainly for the best.”209 If nothing more, a Serbian
attempt to annex a consenting Republic of Srpska would display
extremely poor optics given these circumstances, and would provide a
strong reason for the international community not to support or
recognize Republic of Srpska’s independence movement. However,
Serbia must support the Republic of Srpska’s independence
movement. Currently, Serbia has opposed recognizing the legitimacy
of Republic of Srpska’s independence.210 This is most likely because of
the parallel situation of the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo. Dodik
himself has recently stated, “[i]t is impossible to discuss the special
status of Kosovo without discussing the status of [the Republic of
Srpska] in parallel.”211 The problem is that Dodik would seek the
Serbian President’s Praise Of Milosevic A ‘Provocation,’ Neighbors Say, RADIO
FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.rferl.org/a/serbianpresident-vucic-praise-milosevic-provocation-kosovo-croatiamogherini/29482484.html; see also, Dan Bilefsky, Ultranationalist-Turned-Liberal Is
Expected
to
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TIMES
(Mar.
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2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/world/europe/ultranationalist-turnedliberal-is-expected-to-lead-serbia.html.
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Republic of Srpska’s annexation into Serbia if independence was
gained: “[Dodik] hoped RS and Serbia would one day be one state.”212
Serbia is in a tough position. If Serbia recognizes the Republic of
Srpska’s independence, the parallel situation between Kosovo and the
Republic of Srpska means that Serbia’s claim over Kosovo as a
“breakaway province” would be severely delegitimized.213 Thus, it
seems that for Serbia to aid the Republic of Srpska independence
movement, the issue of Kosovo must be resolved first.
Things, however, are changing on that front. Recently, in
September 2020, Kosovo’s and Serbia’s leaders met in Brussels. After
these talks concluded, the E.U. Special Representative of the talks
claimed that progress was made in regards to “economic cooperation
and missing people.”214 If future talks progress positively, and Serbia
and Kosovo open themselves to at least cooperation, and at most
coordination, the Republic of Srpska could use that amiability to their
advantage. Again, a major reason that Serbia opposes independence of
the Republic of Srpska is that it would also have to recognize the
legitimacy of Kosovo.
Despite these developments, there are still many barriers for
the Republic of Srpska’s independence movement if using Kosovo as
an example for secession. First, there is little historical precedent for
the geographical boundaries of what is now the Republic of Srpska.215
The boundaries of the Republic of Srpska resulted directly from the
Bosnian War and Serbian aggression – a fact that has real ramifications
for any desire for independence. Second, Kosovo and the Republic of
Srpska are different in the fact that Kosovo faced extreme state
persecution from Serbia, which was a primary factor for Kosovo’s
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independence.216 The Republic of Srpska has not and is not facing state
persecution to the degree that Kosovars did. Third, there are continual
fears that unlike Kosovo, a Republic of Srpska secession attempt could
not only spark regional tension, but also global conflict because of the
polarizing nature of the issue.217 Russian backing of the Republic of
Srpska secession coupled with Western opposition could render the
two sides in opposition especially if actual conflict were to occur in
BiH between the ethnicities. Finally, there is a strong possibility that a
Republic of Srpska secession attempt would drive a Bosnian Croat
secession attempt.218 If this were to occur, the Republic of Srpska and
its independence movement would be seen as the root of the new
Balkanization attempts, and their international image would sour.
These arguments against Republic of Srpska secession have been
around for decades and must be considered and argued against if the
Bosnian Serbs really desire to be fully independent while also
appeasing the regional and international community.
V. CONCLUSION
If numerous attempts or threats of secession throughout the
past two and a half decades were any indication of the future, it is clear
that secession will remain at least an ancillary focus for the Republic of
Srpska in the coming decade. Further, the move could actually be
realized with the political support of the international community.
Ethnic tensions, kept alive by the ethnocentric nature of the Dayton
Accords, have left the country ethnically separate in geography,
ideology, politics, and culture. This separation has left the BiH
economically stagnate and seemingly irreversibly corrupt to its core.
While the legality of any secession is perpetually under debate, history
See Asim Mujkic, Significance of Kosovo from the point of view of Bosnia and
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of secession and international secession law has proven that
independence movements are largely political in nature. Continual
human rights violations have arisen directly from the Dayton Accords,
along with the government structure dictated by it – a government
structure prone to gridlock and injustices incomparable to other
nations in the region. The result of this gridlock is the inability of the
federal government to implement constitutional reform. However,
these human rights violations and lack of success for constitutional
reform provide the basis for Republic of Srpska secession. Further, if
the issues between Kosovo and Serbia are resolved and if the Republic
of Srpska can convince the international community that its intentions
for secession are both practical and non-threatening to the regional or
international communities, it has a very strong chance of its secession
attempt being accepted as legitimate.
There are many areas where this research could be bolstered.
First, there has been a continual question of whether the political
leaders of the Republic of Srpska will actually follow through with
secession, or if talks of it are just used as empty threats to advance their
political aspirations.219 Further, these secession threats could be just a
ploy to garner support from voters.220 Regardless, a vital factor of the
success of the Republic of Srpska secession movement will be
determined by the seriousness of their political leader’s intentions.
Second, an analysis on what could cause a secession movement to
primarily occur would greatly aid this piece. Although this comment
has highlighted the many different secession attempts of the Republic
of Srpska, the conditions that lead to secession attempts has not been
considered. To understand the domestic, regional, and international
conditions that would favor a secession attempt would provide clarity
on when to expect further attempts in the future, and maybe even what
the outcome could be. Obviously, this research would be greatly aided
by a regional perspective on the issue of Republic of Srpska’s secession
219 See James Ker-Lindsay, The Hollow Threat of Secession in Bosnia and
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attempts. This comment is from a Western and purely academic
perspective, which has its inherent and consequential impediments.
Bosnian Serb secession ideas have been fomenting since the
creation of BiH. Ethnic hatred of the past, propped up by the Dayton
Peace Accords, has contributed to the continual human rights
violations and political warfare in the federal government from the
three constituent peoples. This has been the main reason behind
economic, cultural, and political stagnation since the end of the
Bosnian War. This analysis has found little reason to believe that
political infighting will not continue in the decades to come. If peaceful
secession is gained by the Bosnian Serbs, there will be tangible hope
for constitutional change to eliminate discrimination at all levels of
society at the very least. At most, Serb secession could fulfill a longsought after peaceful solution to the ethnic tensions that have persisted
for many decades.
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